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A B S T R A C T
The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) label is one of the most widely accepted standards aimed at assessing long-
term sustainable forest management worldwide. Through audits, accredited certiﬁcation bodies assess the level
of conformity of a ﬁrm’s performance against the standard to grant or not the certiﬁcate on behalf of the FSC. In
this paper, we assess the scope auditors have to shape the implementation of the FSC standard in Brazil. Our
work is based on the analysis of certiﬁcation bodies’ rules and of available public full assessment and annual
audit reports covering the period 2009–2013, completed with interviews with key informants. We show that
most indicators of the Brazilian FSC standard leave no scope for interpretation. However, ﬁrms are certiﬁed and
re-certiﬁed with a signiﬁcant number of minor non-conformance with social, legal and environmental indicators.
Moreover, the gradual improvement of the performance of the ﬁrm cannot always be considered as ﬁnal. We
conclude that some indicators are too broad and need to be clariﬁed, that the FSC should limit the number of
minor non-conformance issues allowed and prohibit their recurrence. More systematic surveys could narrow
possible interpretations by auditors and certiﬁcation bodies.
1. Introduction
The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) was founded in 1993 by a
group of businesses, environmentalists and community leaders to cat-
alyze changes towards sustainable forest management worldwide
(Pinto and McDermott, 2013). Member of ISEAL (International Social
and Environmental Accreditation and Labeling) Alliance, with slightly
over 180 million hectares certiﬁed by FSC in 80 countries, it is one of
the most widely recognized forest certiﬁcation systems. Its aim is to
reassure consumers that the timber products they are buying come from
well managed forests that respect speciﬁc environmental, social and
economic principles and criteria (Lewis and Davis, 2015). It is a quite
demanding standard since certiﬁcation is based on 10 principles, 55
criteria and an average of 200 indicators that have to be veriﬁed by
external audit. Certiﬁcation bodies and their auditors report con-
formance and non-conformance with each indicator, request corrective
actions (CAR) and grant (or not) certiﬁcation. They are responsible for
the quality and eﬀectiveness of the certiﬁcation system (Tulaeva,
2013).
Several authors have analyzed why forest companies are reforming
their practices to comply with the FSC standard (e.g. Harstﬁeld and
Ostermeier, 2003; Cashore et al., 2005; Van Kooten et al., 2005;
Overdevest and Rickenbach, 2006; Araujo et al., 2009; Galati et al.,
2017). Even with sometimes limitations to their basis for causal in-
ference (Romero et al., 2017), others have focused on the impacts of
FSC on forest management (e.g. Cerutti et al., 2011), on the enhance-
ment of livelihood conditions (e.g. Cerutti et al., 2014; Harada, 2014;
Kalonga and Kulindwa, 2017), or on the conservation of ecosystem
services (e.g. Van Kuijk et al., 2009; Sheil et al., 2010; Nasi et al., 2012;
Dias et al., 2015). By looking at the impacts of FSC through the results
of certiﬁcation audits, several studies have provided detailed analysis of
the CARs found in audit reports (e.g. Newsom et al., 2006; Pena Claros
et al., 2009; Masters et al., 2010).
Despite these studies, more research is needed on how certiﬁcation
is implemented (Tysiachniouk and McDermott, 2016). Indeed, little is
known about “how” certiﬁcation bodies, auditors’ rules, and audit
procedures shape the implementation of the standard even though what
they deﬁne as non-compliance guides the company in reforming their
forest management through the required corrective action (Maletz and
Tysiachniouk, 2009). A better understanding of the “how” requires
examination of the indicators of speciﬁc national standards, the rules
and practices of certiﬁcation bodies and their auditors.
To ﬁll this knowledge gap, this paper assesses the scope certiﬁcation
bodies and auditors have to shape the implementation of the FSC
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standard.
We selected one case study, Brazil, where a total of 6 168 550
hectares had been certiﬁed by FSC in May 2016 (FSC, 2016), ranking
Brazil 7th worldwide and ﬁrst among tropical countries. Seventy-ﬁve
percent of certiﬁed areas are forest plantations, which have increased
dramatically in the last 10 years. Moreover, around 1.5 million hectares
of natural forests managed and certiﬁed by FSC are located in the
Brazilian Amazon. Forest certiﬁcation in this biome is expected to in-
crease the ﬁnancial proﬁtability of sustainable forest management and
to help reduce forest degradation, which, unlike deforestation, may
have increased in the last decade (Souza et al., 2013).
2. Material and methods
2.1. Overview
The two major certiﬁcation bodies implementing FSC certiﬁcation
of forest management and plantation in Brazil are the Rainforest
Alliance, through its representative, the Institute of Forest and
Agriculture Management and Certiﬁcation (Portuguese acronym IMA-
FLORA) and the SCS Global Service (SCS), through its representative
SYSFLOR. In 2013, IMAFLORA and SYSFLOR certiﬁed respectively 64%
and 26% of the total area under forest management and plantations
with a FSC label. For both, we combined a review of public documents,
qualitative interviews and a quantitative analysis of indicators and non-
conformance found in audit reports. Public summary audit reports were
examined to trace non-conformance (see below and Table 1). FSC
public guidelines for certiﬁcation bodies were analyzed to look for
general rules applied to audit procedures. Eight qualitative interviews
were conducted with certiﬁcation managers of IMAFLORA and SYS-
FLOR (2 interviews), the coordinator of certiﬁcation of IMAFLORA (1
interview), auditors of IMAFLORA and SYSFLOR (5 interviews), to
complete existing information regarding audit procedures and to vali-
date quantitative analysis of NCs found in audit reports. The aim of the
methodology was to assess the scope auditors have to shape the im-
plementation of the standard because of the structure of the standard
itself (how widely can the indicators of the standards be interpreted?)
and because of the speciﬁc rules of the certiﬁcation bodies as private
entities (is there any scope for interpretation in the private rules for
audits drawn up by certiﬁcation bodies?).
2.2. Procedures and sample
The ﬁrst step of our work was to analyze the speciﬁc rules deﬁned
by certifying bodies to guide the implementation of certiﬁcation in
order to assess if these rules leave any scope for interpretation. For
example, in addition to FSC rules, certiﬁcation bodies can have their
own speciﬁc rules that limit (or not) possible interpretation i.e. by
strictly deﬁning the levels of performance for some indicators (or not),
leaving open the number of documents to be checked for speciﬁc in-
dicators (or not). We searched all available public documents and
completed our knowledge through qualitative interviews with IMAFL-
ORA and SYSFLOR certiﬁcation managers.
Since 2014, the two FSC standards implemented for private forest
management and forest plantation in Brazil have been respectively the
FSC standard for Forest Management on “Terra Firme” in the Brazilian
Amazon (FSC-STD-BRA-01-2001 V1-1 EN) and the Harmonized
Certiﬁcation Bodies’ Forest Stewardship Plantation Standard for the
Federative Republic of Brazil (FSC-STD-BRA-01-2014V1-1 EN). Before
2014, for forest plantations, two interim standards were applied: the
IMAFLORA interim standard (Assessment of forest plantations man-
agement in Brazil (version – 2.0) and the SCS Interim Standard (version
2, November 2008).
Until 2014, the FSC standard for forest management on "Terra
Firme" comprised nine principles, 55 criteria and 202 indicators. The
two interim standards for forest plantation comprised 10 principles,
56–70 criteria and 202–214 indicators. Our ﬁrst task consisted in
homogenizing the two interim standards for forest plantations. We then
classiﬁed the indicators of each standard in four categories: indicators
reproducing the legal framework vs. indicators that correspond to vo-
luntary commitments, and objective indicators vs. less objective in-
dicators. Objective indicators (OI) are those that are easily evidenced by
documents, registers or through observation of practices in the ﬁeld.
Interpretation cannot vary from one auditor to the other. Less objective
indicators (LOI) are those that can be interpreted diﬀerently depending
on the speciﬁc knowledge or judgment of the expert conducting the
audit, as illustrated by the following example.
In the FSC standard for Forest Management on “Terra Firme” in the
Brazilian Amazon, indicator P6.C5.I10 (Indicator 10, Criterion 5,
Principle 6) states that « The workers of the forest management unit and
the surrounding communities are informed about the importance of the
activities of forest management and its environmental implications ».
This statement does not specify what information and communication
processes are essential and acceptable. Are ﬂyers distributed to local
communities or are local workshops suﬃcient? Is it necessary to repeat
the information regularly? If so, how often? If the workers and members
of the local communities, when asked, provide an interpretation of the
information received that is diﬀerent from that provided by the ﬁrm,
are records of the events or copies of the documents distributed suﬃ-
cient? The response to these questions may vary from one auditor to the
other and depends on the context of the audit. Our classiﬁcation aimed
to assess if this happened frequently with the standards implemented
for forest management and forest plantation in Brazil.
FSC certiﬁcates are valid for ﬁve years. In the four years following
the granting of the certiﬁcate, certiﬁcation bodies must perform annual
audits. Annual audits are focused on a smaller number of features in-
cluding speciﬁcally (but not exclusively) the resolution of non-con-
formance issues identiﬁed the previous year. Indeed, during full as-
sessments (audits for certiﬁcation), annual audits and re-assessments
(audits for re-certiﬁcation), auditors report the observed conformance,
non-conformance (NC) and corrective actions implemented by certiﬁ-
cate holders to resolve the previous NCs. The certiﬁcate holder is re-
sponsible for taking corrective actions.
Auditors can grade NCs as either major or minor. Major NCs imply
prohibition: they have to be solved before the certiﬁcate is granted.
After a full assessment or re-assessment, the ﬁrms have up to one year
to solve major NCs, or a new full assessment has to be performed. When
major NCs are found in annual monitoring audits, the ﬁrms have only
three months to correct them and if auditors ﬁnd ﬁve or more major
NCs, they can suspend the certiﬁcate. Minor NCs do not prevent certi-
ﬁcation. They have to be solved within one year. A minor NC that is not
solved after one year automatically becomes major in the following
annual audit and then has to be solved in three months. There are no
quantitative limits to the number of minor NCs. However, if too many
minor NCs are found for the same criterion, the criterion itself might be
tagged as a major NC.
Certiﬁcation and annual audit reports are public and can be con-
sulted on FSC website (http://info.fsc.org/certiﬁcate.php#result). But
this public database does not contain old reports. Primary data collec-
tion occurred in 2014. We surveyed all the certiﬁcation and re-certiﬁ-
cation reports available on FSC website and found 12 reports for the
standard FSC standard for Forest Management on “Terra Firme” in the
Brazilian Amazon and 46 reports for the interim FSC standards for
forest plantations (see Table 1). These reports covered the period 2009
to 2013.
In each report, we identiﬁed the minor NCs and distributed them
according to our four categories.
Finally only for the ﬁrms certiﬁed by the FSC standard for Forest
Management on “Terra Firme” in the Brazilian Amazon, we identiﬁed
the number of minor NCs cited in their certiﬁcation (full assessment
and/or re-assessment reports) and annual audit reports. Reports not
found on FSC website were requested directly from IMAFLORA and
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SYSFLOR. We could ﬁnd and analyze 42 reports (see Table 2).
2.3. Limits
Despite the transparency of FSC certiﬁcation and the availability of
certiﬁcation and annual audit reports, conformance assessments by
auditors are not published, i.e., only non-conformance reports and the
description and judgment of the corrective actions taken by certiﬁcate
holders can be found in public reports. FSC has published normative
documents (#73 documents) guiding auditors’ behavior and audit
procedures that deﬁne how the conformance of indicators shall be as-
sessed during audits. Moreover, the competence, impartiality and
performance capability of certiﬁcation bodies against FSC standards is
guaranteed by accreditation from Accreditation Services International
(ASI). ASI veriﬁes and testiﬁes that auditors assess various indicators
properly. Nevertheless, there is still scope for interpretation since the
means of veriﬁcation are not systematically deﬁned and may vary from
one certiﬁcation body to the other. A full comparison of the con-
formance and non-conformance assessments made by auditors would
have enabled us to reﬁne our analysis.
We were not able to access the full rules of audit implementation
deﬁned by certiﬁcation bodies. According to Brazilian legislation, both
IMAFLORA and SYSFLOR are considered private entities. They have
complemented FSC rules by speciﬁc guides that detail their own modus
operandi (mode of operation) for audit rules. These guides are con-
ﬁdential because certiﬁcation bodies have to protect their technical
expertise and intellectual property. As conﬁrmed by the representatives
of the certiﬁcation bodies we interviewed, a large number of rules are
taken directly from FSC directives, so there are probably no major
diﬀerences between certiﬁcation bodies. However, we were unable to
assess whether minor diﬀerences could shape the implementation of the
standard diﬀerently.
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Most indicators in the Brazilian FSC standards are objective
Tables 3 and 4 present the number of indicators reproducing the
laws and the number of voluntary commitments, with the share of
objective indicators and less objective indicators for the FSC standard
for natural forests and forest plantation, respectively.
First, they show that both standards provide added value to the
legal framework, with 68% of the indicators corresponding to voluntary
commitments for the standard for natural forests and 82% for forest
plantations.
The share of indicators that reproduce the laws is the biggest in both
standards for Principle 4 (Workers’ rights and social impact assess-
ment), 1 (Legality and conformity with national laws and FSC rules)
and 6 (Environmental impacts), conﬁrming that the complex Brazilian
legal framework is very demanding (McDermott et al., 2010; Pena
Claros et al., 2009).
Most indicators in both standards can easily be assessed in docu-
ments or by observing practices in the ﬁeld. The standards can thus be
considered as highly objective and scope for interpretation of the in-
dicators by the auditors is very limited.
However, most of the indicators that are subject to possible inter-
pretation are crucial for voluntary commitments. In the standard for
natural forest management, 25 out of 26 less objective indicators attest
to voluntary commitments. In the interim standard for forest
Table 1
Sample of full assessment and re-assessment certiﬁcation reports.
Certiﬁcation body Number of reports Type of reports
Natural forest management
IMAFLORA 10 Full assessments (3)
Re-assessment (7)
SYSFLOR 2 Full assessments (2)
Forest plantation
IMAFLORA 24 Full assessments (18)
Re-assessment (6)
SYSFLOR 22 Full assessments (21)
Re-assessment (01)
Table 2
Sample results for the analysis of changes in minor NCs.
Natural forest management
ﬁrm
Total number of
reports per ﬁrm
Type and number of
reports analyzed
Firm 1 7 2 re-assessment
5 annual audit
Firm 2 3 1 re-assessment
2 annual audit
Firm 3 4 1 re-assessment
3 annual audit
Firm 4 9 1 full-assessment
1 re-assessment
7 annual audit
Firm 5 6 1 full-assessment
5 annual audit
Firm 6 9 1 full-assessment
1 re-assessment
7 annual Audit
Firm 7 2 1 full assessment
1 annual Audit
Firm 8 2 1 full assessment
1 annual Audit
Table 3
Distribution of objective and less objective indicators in the Brazilian FSC standard for natural forests.
Principles Indicators reproducing the laws Indicators of voluntary commitments Total
# % OI # % OI # % OI % LOI
1. Legality and conformity with national laws and FSC rules 11 91 13 54 24 71 29
2. Property rights and communities access to land and resources 4 100 12 100 16 100 0
3. Indigenous People 1 100 13 62 14 65 35
4. Assessment of workers’ rights and social impacts 27 100 25 84 52 92 8
5. Beneﬁts from forests 2 100 16 75 18 78 22
6. Environmental impacts 9 100 30 93 39 95 5
7. Management plan 11 100 17 76 28 85 15
8. Monitoring 0 0 10 100 10 100 0
9. High conservation value 0 0 1 100 1 100 0
# # # # # # #
Total 65 64 137 112 202 176 26
# Number of indicators.
Source: The authors based on public audit reports.
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plantations, the nine less objective indicators concern voluntary com-
mitments.
Some of these voluntary commitments are very representative of the
added value to the already complex Brazilian legal framework provided
by FSC certiﬁcation. For Principle 1, they require an eﬀective engage-
ment by the ﬁrm outside the boundaries of its properties to prevent or
control invasions and ﬁres by third parties. For Principles 3 and 7 in the
natural forest management standard, they cover several important as-
pects regarding the information provided to traditional, indigenous
communities and more broadly, to local stakeholders, concerning forest
management decisions, their possible participation and the minimiza-
tion of negative social and cultural impacts. For Principle 5, they cover
several actions aimed at enhancing the value of the forests beyond
timber management and at promoting long-term investment. For
Principle 4, they cover issues such as the avoidance of employment
turnover or involving neighboring communities in decisions concerning
forest management activities.
In the standard on forest plantations, the less objective indicators in
Principle 4 aim to encourage the ﬁrm to give priority to local em-
ployment and purchases. Those in Principles 2 and 3 try to ensure that
the local, traditional and indigenous communities who are impacted by
forest activities have given their free and informed consent. Those in
Principle 6 make it possible to avoid the conversion of natural forests
into forest plantations.
Other less objective indicators are simply impossible to check
through an audit procedure. This is especially true of four indicators in
Principle 1 of the natural forest management standard. They require the
ﬁrm to respect the international conventions on Climate, Biological
Diversity, Labor International Organization and International Tropical
Timber. Such indicators are much too broad to be objectively checked
by the auditors and depend on their speciﬁc expertise for each con-
vention.
3.2. Minor non-conformance (NC) issues mainly concern objective
indicators (OI)
Table 5 shows that companies are certiﬁed by the Brazilian natural
forests FSC standard with, on average, 10% of the indicators in minor
NCs, the same share amounting to 5% for forest plantations certiﬁed by
FSC. Most NCs concern objective indicators, i.e. their assessment does
not depend on auditors’ speciﬁc expertise or on the context of the audit.
This means that the corrective actions required are mostly linked with
the requirements of the standards. Finally, a signiﬁcant number of NC
issues concern indicators reproducing the legal framework. These in-
dicators are easily assessed through an audit. This means that certiﬁ-
cation by FSC in Brazil does not necessarily guarantee that certiﬁed
forest companies are complying with all existing social and environ-
mental laws.
In both standards, most NC issues concern Principle 4 (working
conditions) and Principle 6 (environmental impacts) (Table 6), con-
ﬁrming previous quantitative analysis (e.g. Silva et al., 2016; Rafael
et al., 2018). These two principles have the highest number of in-
dicators (Tables 3 and 4), which can explain the high number of NC
found. For example, in the Brazilian FSC standard for Natural Forests,
Principle 4 reproduces the completeness and complexity of the laws
regulating working conditions in Brazil with 27 indicators of the laws
and 25 indicators corresponding to voluntary commitments. Exhaustive
compliance with all the legal requirements concerning health, hygiene
and safe working conditions appears to be almost impossible for forest
Table 4
Distribution of objective and less objective indicators in the Brazilian interim FSC standard for forest plantations.
Principles Indicators reproducing the laws Indicators of voluntary commitments Total
# % OI # % OI # % OI % LOI
1. Legality and conformity with national laws and FSC rules 8 100 10 90 18 94 6
2. Property rights and communities access to land and resources 1 100 11 90 12 91 9
3. Indigenous People 1 100 14 93 15 93 7
4. Assessment of workers’ rights and social impacts 12 100 15 80 27 85 15
5. Beneﬁts from forests 3 100 13 100 16 100 0
6. Environmental impacts 8 100 24 96 32 97 3
7. Management plan 0 0 19 100 19 100 0
8. Monitoring 0 0 26 100 26 100 0
9. High conservation value 0 0 16 100 16 100 0
10. Speciﬁc aspects of plantations 3 0 20 100 23 96 4
# # # # # # #
Total 36 36 168 161 204 195 9
# Number of indicators.
Source: The authors based on public audit reports.
Table 5
Number and distribution of minor NCs.
Standard Number
of reports
Number of
indicators
assessed
Average
number of
NCs per
report
Share
of OIs
in NCs
Share of
legal
indicators in
NCs
Natural forests 12 202 21 96% 44%
Plantations 46 204 10 98% 28%
Table 6
Distribution of minor NCs according to principles in the two Brazilian standards.
Principles Brazilian FSC standard
for natural forests
Brazilian interim
standards for forest
plantations
Number % Number %
1. Legality and conformity
with national laws and
FSC rules
9 6 51 10
2. Property rights and
communities’ access to
land and resources
8 5 11 2
3. Indigenous People 4 3 6 1
4. Assessment of workers’
rights and social impacts
41 27 151 28
5. Beneﬁts from forests 8 5 15 3
6. Environmental impacts 34 22 103 19
7. Management plan 26 17 64 12
8. Monitoring 12 8 65 12
9. High conservation value 10 7 25 5
10. Speciﬁc aspects of
plantations
NA NA 43 8
Total 152 100 534 100
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companies. Principle 6 comprises a larger share of indicators of vo-
luntary commitments with important requirements to encourage com-
panies to minimize their environmental impacts.
Unfortunately, as mentioned above, the way conformance is as-
sessed in certiﬁcation and re-certiﬁcation audits is not included in
public audit reports, so we can only state, but not analyze in more
detail, that less objective indicators are rarely found in non-con-
formance. This could be because there is scope for interpretation by the
auditors when the indicators are assessed or because it is less diﬃcult to
comply with them.
3.3. The improved performance concept: strength and limits
Companies are thus certiﬁed despite minor non-conformance issues,
and it appears to be almost impossible to avoid this situation, at least
for Brazilian forest companies, given the complexity of the legal fra-
mework and the large number of indicators.
Certiﬁcation bodies have endorsed a position defending the im-
proved performance concept. Such a position is not oﬃcially accepted
by FSC but appears to be an unavoidable management decision. Indeed,
auditing is not only a matter of checking a list of indicators but also a
way to promote the improvement of the social, economic and en-
vironmental performance of forest companies. Even if FSC can be
considered as a performance-based certiﬁcation system of organiza-
tions, many of the indicators are not based on absolute values of speciﬁc
performances but rather on processes. In this situation, certiﬁcation
bodies recognize that optimum performance may not be immediately
reachable and hence allow time to reach speciﬁc targets. In this context,
the number of NC issues would be expected to be high in the ﬁrst years
of certiﬁcation but to gradually decline thanks to the implementation of
the corrective actions.
A look at the ﬁrst available certiﬁcation report and the last annual
audit report of certiﬁed forest companies conﬁrms that the number of
minor NCs decreases, sometimes substantially (Table 7). What is more,
except in two cases, companies never exceed the initial number of NCs,
evidence that there has indeed been some improvement. However, such
improvement is not always gradual and continuous as shown for ﬁrms
1, 3, 4 and 6 in Table 7.
Moreover, some minor NC issues appeared several times for the
same ﬁrm. Firm 1 had a minor NC for indicator P4.C2.I15 three times,
Firm 4 had minor NCs for indicator P4.C2.I30 twice, and Firm 6 had
minor NCs for indicator P8.C1.I1 twice.
Indicator P4.C2.I15 lays down safety conditions for the transport of
workers. The main diﬃculty with this indicator is assessing if the in-
vestments made by the ﬁrm to solve the non-conformance issue and to
prevent recurrence in an annual audit are suﬃcient for all forest op-
erations in the long term. Indicator P4.C2.I30 requires that sub-
contractors of the forest company comply with labor laws. As men-
tioned previously, given the complexity of the Brazilian labor laws and
the institutional context in the Amazon, the companies themselves have
some diﬃculty complying with all the rules, and the situation is of
course the same for their subcontractors. A company may thus have
diﬃculty systematically ﬁnding subcontractors who comply with all the
labor laws. Indicator P8.C1.I1 refers to post-exploration monitoring:
this indicator requires that companies present a documented plan to
monitor all aspects of forest management, not only environmental but
also social aspects. Auditors can accept the presentation of the method
to monitor post-exploration as evidence of conformance, but some au-
ditors shape the implementation of the standard complementing in-
dicator P8.C1.I1. They ask for evidence that the method is eﬀectively
applied and that the measurements are suﬃciently consistent to show
the changes made year by year, even though the word eﬀective is not
part of the indicator.
3.4. Grading non-conformance
Understanding how auditors grade non-conformance issues is im-
portant because their grading aﬀects the amount of time the ﬁrm has to
implement corrective actions without losing certiﬁcation. Like the rules
governing auditing, the general rules on how to grade a conformance as
minor or major are deﬁned by FSC guiding principles and completed by
the speciﬁc (conﬁdential) rules of the certiﬁcation bodies. Completing
the public documents with interviews enabled us to identify the ob-
jective and subjective criteria applied during auditing.
First, if there are no stated limits to the number of minor NCs that
prevent certiﬁcation, a criterion with a large number of indicators in
minor NC will generally be tagged as major non-conformance.
Second, when the non-conformance of one indicator is observed
over a large area of forest or concerns a large number of people, it is
usually also tagged as a major NC. For example, indicator P6.C3.I1
requires the conservation of tree seeds in the Forest Management Unit
to guarantee the reproduction of the species. If the audit reveals that
these tree seeds are not conserved in a large number of working units,
the indicator must be tagged as major non-conformance. The same
applies to indicator P6.C5.I6 when soil erosion is found over a large
area of the forest management unit or when the process of erosion is
very severe. However, the quantitative levels or thresholds for these
indicators are not always speciﬁed. What is more, for some indicators
(such as the sustainable species regeneration), more research is needed
to identify speciﬁc thresholds (for example, for the conservation of tree
seeds).
Third, very few or no exceptions are allowed for certain indicators
(5 indicators in both standards). This is the case for safe working con-
ditions. Even if only one worker is found working with a dangerous
product or equipment without adequate protective clothing, this is
suﬃcient to grade a major non-conformance for the indicator. This rule
aims to force the ﬁrm to rapidly correct the situation. The auditor can
even grade a major non-conformance and allow only one month for
corrective action.
Finally, auditors must also check for the possible recurrence of
certain non-conformance issues throughout the ﬁve years of a certiﬁ-
cation cycle. If a minor non-conformance with an indicator is observed
more than once during the cycle, it shall be graded as a major non-
conformance.
Although such rules may seem very clear and easy to apply, some
diﬃculties persist for less objective indicators or for indicators that
have several dimensions. For example, the ﬁrst indicator of Principle 1
requires that the ﬁrm comply with all the laws, regulations and ad-
ministrative procedures at the municipal, state and federal levels.
Recurrence may be diagnosed because, in one year, the ﬁrm does not
comply with one municipal administrative procedure, whereas, four
years later, non-compliance is found for a federal procedure. In this
case, the NC may remain minor even if it occurs twice. The same si-
tuation may also occur because some administrative procedures depend
on public institutions, and even if the ﬁrm does everything in its power
Table 7
Number of minor NC issues each year for ﬁrms certiﬁed for natural forest management.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Firm 1 37 10 10 9 6 12 5
Firm 2 11 9 4
Firm 3 27 2 3 3
Firm 4 29 12 9 8 13 16 7 6 9
Firm 5 13 14 2 0 1 0
Firm 6 14 6 8 15 5 12 3 8 4
Firm 7 12 0
Firm 8 14 4
Source: The authors based on reports found on http://info.fsc.org/certiﬁcate.php#result
in 2014 and additional reports requested to certiﬁcation bodies.
Note: Bold numbers are coming from full assessment or re-assessment reports, other
numbers from annual audit reports.
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to obtain all the licenses required to operate, some public institutions
may fail to deliver them in time. Moreover, all the indicators requiring
the assessment of the magnitude of any actions or damage without
specifying the exact acceptable level is subject to interpretation by the
auditors. This explains why the grading of the same situation may also
vary from one auditor to the other.
The ﬁnal decision regarding the grading of any NC belongs to the
certiﬁcation manager, who is usually more experienced than the in-
dividual auditors, and who undertakes a complete review of the ﬁnal
report handed in by the audit team. During this process, some grades
may change based on evidence the certiﬁcation manager ﬁnds in the
report or on further dialogue with the audit team. Peer reviewers are
also involved in full assessment and re-assessment reports. They can
point out diﬀerent NC grading or decisions with respect to some in-
dicators. The certiﬁcation manager can accept their indication or not.
Peer reviewers’ suggestions are conﬁdential and were therefore not
available for inspection during our study.
4. Conclusion
The large number of objective indicators in the Brazilian FSC
standards limits the possibility that auditors shape its implementation.
Nevertheless, they still have important responsibilities in the process of
implementation, some of which involve risks for the certiﬁcation bodies
themselves. FSC should undertake systematic surveys, based on ASI
assessments, with certiﬁcation bodies, to identify the persisting bot-
tlenecks regarding possible interpretations by auditors and certiﬁcation
bodies.
With the existing system of minor and major non-conformance, the
auditors decide how much time the companies have to correct man-
agement failures without losing their certiﬁcation. The certiﬁcation
manager of each audit team is responsible for deciding if the overall
performance of the company is suﬃcient to justify certiﬁcation, even
with a signiﬁcant number of minor non-conformance issues. At the
same time, such decisions are those that allow the company to make
further improvements.
Certiﬁed companies do not comply with all the indicators of the
standard. In the Brazilian context, this means in particular that auditors
and certiﬁcation bodies do not succeed in guaranteeing full compliance
with the labor and environmental legislation. FSC should work more
closely with national teams to deﬁne which indicators of the national
standards can explicitly remain not fully in full conformance during a
speciﬁed period because their full conformance does not depend only
on the certiﬁcate holders’ actions. FSC could also promote more fre-
quent reviews of the national standards and of their indicators, for
example every two years instead of every ﬁve years currently, to ac-
count for the results of the audits.
Like for major non-conformance issues, the FSC should set a limit to
the number of minor non-conformance issues allowed and forbid the
recurrence of certain minor non-conformance issues. The possible re-
currence of NCs should be checked not only over one cycle of certiﬁ-
cation but right from the beginning of certiﬁcation. Any indicator found
more than once in minor NCs should be automatically tagged as a major
NC, even if the recurrence occurred in another certiﬁcation cycle.
Some indicators are still too broad to be properly checked by an
audit and are subject to interpretation by an auditor. They render the
task of certiﬁcation bodies and auditors even more diﬃcult and need to
be clariﬁed. The scope of such indicators should be narrowed to con-
sider the dimensions that only depend on the ﬁrm’s management de-
cisions or should be removed from the standard, thereby recognizing
that an audit procedure does not allow true assessment. Further, the
recurrence of minor NCs should not be permitted even if the NC does
not refer to the same dimension.
Indicators referring to the magnitude of any action or damage
should clearly specify the minimum acceptable levels.
For indicators that engage not only the responsibility of the
company itself but also the responsibility of public institutions (e.g. the
delivery of licenses), it is crucial to deﬁne exactly what eﬀort made by
the company is suﬃcient to consider that the indicator conforms.
The International FSC Board is aware of some of these challenges. In
2012, the organization issued the new set of Principles and Criteria and
initiated the development of International Generic Indicators (IGIs).
IGIs are indicators designed as references for the development of
National Indicators. At present, for each criterion, FSC National
Initiatives can adopt the IGIs as proposed, adapt, or drop them. In 2015,
FSC Brazil thus started to develop new standards for native and plan-
tation forests. There has been a trend to adopt the IGIs as written with
no radical adaptations or exclusions, because the proposed indicators
are shorter and more objective. The criterion of auditability was taken
into consideration when they were being developed. Despite these
improvements, some IGIs are still subject to interpretation by auditors.
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